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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a partial equilibrium model of a product that can
be manufactured by using a recycled material as well as a virgin natural resource.
In particular, we consider the possibility that a household may resort to the illicit
disposal of its waste, such as midnight dumping, instead of discarding it properly.
Our focus is on conducting a comparative static analysis on the second-best level
of the government's policing e®ort to counter illegal disposal. More speci¯cally, we
examine how the government should adjust the e®ort level in response to changes
in the environmental damage cost of illegal disposal and exported waste.
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1 Introduction
It is frequently reported that the illegal dumping of household waste and exported waste
pose increasingly signi¯cant problems. A number of economic studies have tackled the
issue of reducing unlawful waste disposal and, in particular, recycling wasted materials
into productive resources (e.g., Smith, 1972, Dinan, 1993, Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995,
Palmer and Walls, 1997, Shinkuma, 2003). These studies have mainly examined the
properties of some combinations of di®erent policy instruments, ranging from a disposal
fee-cum-subsidy, a recycling charge-cum-subsidy, a tax on the extraction of the virgin
resource, and recycled content standards under a variety of settings.
As for illegal waste disposal, Sullivan (1987) derives the optimal enforcement e®ort of
the budget-constrained authority, along with the optimal subsidy for the legal disposal
to counter midnight dumping by waste generating producers. Sullivan (1987) resorts
to the assumption of `a rational criminal' a la Becker (1968) in describing the behavior
of these producers.1 In this article, we follow a similar line of reasoning regarding the
causes of illegal waste disposal, which eventually lead to environmental damage. Hence,
we suppose that the prevalence of illegal disposal will be in°uenced by the size of the
expected ¯ne, which in turn depends on the severity of the governmental policing e®ort
used to deter the illegal activity. This level of e®ort should be considerably easier to
manipulate relative to other policy instruments and even to changing the level of the
¯ne for illicit waste disposal, owing to the legislative and judicial procedures involved in
the implementation of policy alterations. Thus, we consider that the authority adjusts
the level of policing activities so that they are more readily altered in accommodating
possible changes in circumstances.
In contrast to Sullivan (1987), where attention is mostly paid to the direct e®ect
of reducing illegal disposal, this paper also considers the impact of illegal disposal on
recycling activities and the output market. These have not been fully explored in previous
work. More speci¯cally, we conduct a simple comparative static analysis and show how,
in the absence of other policy instruments, the second-best policing e®ort level depends
1More recent advances in the methods of enforcing environmentally related regulations are surveyed
in Cohen (1999) and Heyes (2000). For a more general regulation case, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
2
on various environmental conditions, including the cost arising from damage through
illegal disposal and exported waste.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of our
model. In Section 3, we set up a social welfare function and conduct a comparative static
analysis on the second-best policing e®ort. The ¯nal section contains some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Our model contains a price-taking household and a price-taking producer of a potentially
recyclable consumer product. For simplicity, we normalize the number of households and
producers to one, respectively.
We suppose that the consumption of xD units of the product yields xD units of waste
to be disposed of. In disposing of its own waste, the household has two options. The ¯rst
is legal disposal where the household must hand its waste over to the producer of the
consumer product in a speci¯c manner. We assume that legal disposal causes a certain
level of inconvenience to the household, as well as the costs involved in temporary storage
and the ensuing transportation of waste to a proper collection site at a speci¯ed date.
The second alternative for the household is to get rid of its waste unlawfully, such as
dumping the waste at nondesignated sites at midnight. Disposal of illegal waste in this
manner leads to a negative environmental externality. Moreover, in discarding waste
illicitly, the household incurs some cost, physically and perhaps psychologically. The
household disposes of w units of waste legally, while the remainder, i.e., xD ¡ w units
of household's waste, are disposed of illegally. Accordingly, in this economy, w units
of waste are processed legally and eventually handed over to the producer through the
government collection.2
Further, we assume that the producer has the responsibility to treat the waste, either
by recycling to create a resource that can be used for the production of the original output
2In Japan, for instance, the national government has recently implemented a new law that requires
a producer of consumer products to take back certain types of household waste and make an e®ort to
recycle some pre-speci¯ed portion (Kawakami, 2001).
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or by exporting and selling the waste to a foreign ¯rm at a ¯xed price.3 As a result, the
¯rm can produce the output by using both a recycled resource, r, and a virgin natural
resource, v, that can be purchased at a ¯xed price.
2.1 The Behavior of the Household
Let us start by describing the representative household's behavior. As a critical assump-
tion, we suppose that the household is su±ciently rational or far-sighted so that, when
determining how much of the good it purchases, it takes into account the eventual waste
disposal following consumption of the product.
We ¯rst consider the household's decision making concerning how to discard its waste.
In disposing of waste, which amounts to xD, the household attempts to minimize its
expected disposal cost by selecting the level of legal disposal, w (0 · w · xD), as
follows:4
Min
w
CH (xD; w) = ®w +
¯
2
w2 +
n
¼Á (xD ¡ w) + ´
2
(xD ¡ w)2
o
: (1)
In (1), ® (® > 0) is the collection charge per unit of legal disposal, which the household
pays to the government. Legal disposal incurs another type of cost for the household in
the form of a carrying cost, which is represented in a quadratic fashion by the parameter,
¯ (¯ > 0). The terms in curly brackets then signify the expected total cost of illegal
disposal. The ¯rst term represents the expected penalty for illegal disposal. Here, ¼ (0 ·
¼ · 1) is the probability of the household being caught for illicit disposal [as shown in the
next section, this can be altered by the authority devoting more resources to crackdown
activities] and Á (Á > 0) is the predetermined ¯ne per unit of illegally disposed waste upon
being detected by the authority. In addition, we include in our model the household's cost
of resorting to illegal disposal activities, such as cautiously carrying the waste to a remote
unpopulated area so as not to be detected. This nonpenalty cost of illicit disposal to the
household is assumed to be quadratic with respect to the amount of illegally disposed
3In this paper, we assume the producer who does not dispose of waste illegally, fearing for distrust of
his/her enterprise. Therefore, our model focuses on only the household's illegal dumping.
4We assume w · xD, which means that the household cannot dispose of more waste than it consumes.
That is, we do not consider the possibility that a household handles its neighbors' waste for any reason.
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waste, xD¡w, and is represented by the second term in the curly brackets with ´ (´ > 0)
as the parameter.
The ¯rst-order condition for cost minimization in (1) yields:5
@CH (xD; w)
@w
= ®+ ¯w ¡ ¼Á¡ ´(xD ¡ w) = 0: (2)
Solving (2) for w, we obtain:
w¤ =
´
¯ + ´
xD +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
; (3)
where w¤ is the cost minimizing value of w given xD and we assume that 0 < w¤ < xD.
Given this result, the household determines its demand for xD by maximizing the
following expected utility function:
Max
xD; z
U (xD; z) = µxD ¡ 1
2
(xD)
2 + z; (4)
s:t: I = pxD + z + C
H(xD; w
¤); (5)
w¤ =
´
¯ + ´
xD +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
; (6)
where the utility of the representative household from its consumption activities, U (xD; z),
is assumed to be quasi-linear, with z being the consumption of the composition goods
that yield no harmful waste and µ¡ xD is the marginal utility of the recyclable product,
xD. As for the constraints, (5), is simply the household's budget constraint, where I and
p, respectively, denote the income of the household and the unit price of xD. The unit
price of z is normalized to 1.
Inserting (6) into (5) and then substituting (5) into (4) to cancel z, we can rewrite
the household's utility maximization problem (4) - (6) as follows:
Max
xD
U (xD) = µxD ¡ 1
2
(xD)
2
+
(
I ¡ pxD ¡ ¯´
2 (¯ + ´)
(xD)
2 ¡ ®´ + ¯¼Á
¯ + ´
xD +
(¼Á¡ ®)2
2 (¯ + ´)
)
: (7)
5The second-order condition for minimization is always satis¯ed as @
2CH(xD;w)
@w2 = ¯ + ´ > 0.
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The ¯rst-order condition for maximization is:
@U (xD)
@xD
= µ ¡ xD ¡ p¡ ¯´
¯ + ´
xD ¡ ®´ + ¯¼Á
¯ + ´
= 0: (8)
Furthermore, we can obtain the inverse demand function of the representative house-
hold as follows:
pD (xD) = ¡
µ
¯ + ´ + ¯´
¯ + ´
¶
xD +
µ
µ ¡ ®´ + ¯¼Á
¯ + ´
¶
: (9)
2.2 The Behavior of the Producer
In the following, we consider the behavior of a ¯rm that produces and sells the output
derived from the recycled resource processed from the household waste, r, and a virgin
natural resource, v. The producer attempts to minimize its total cost of production and
disposal by choosing the level of input, v and r, so the cost minimization problem is as
follows:
Min
v;r
CP (v; r) = pvv + prr ¡ °(w¤ ¡ r); (10)
s:t: w¤ =
´
¯ + ´
xS +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
; (11)
xS = v
¿r½: (12)
We assume that the virgin natural resource can be purchased at a ¯xed price of pv
(pv > 0) in the input market. In processing the household waste into a productive input,
the producer incurs a recycling cost of pr (pr > 0) per unit of the resource. Alternatively,
the producer can sell the remainder of the household waste, w¤ ¡ r, to a foreign ¯rm at
a price of ° (° > 0). The constraint (11) represents the total amount of household's legal
waste disposal collected by the government, which is distributed to the producer without
through the market. In our model, the producer is assumed to recognize that amount and
the way of distribution. The constraint (12) expresses the production function, where ¿
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is a parameter associated with the productivity of the virgin resource input and ½ is that
of the recycled resource input (0 < ¿ < 1; 0 < ½ < 1; 0 < ¿ + ½ < 1).6
By substituting (11) - (12) into (10), we can rewrite the producer's cost minimization
problem (10) - (12) as follows:7
Min
v;r
CP (v; r) = pvv + prr ¡ °
½µ
´
¯ + ´
xS +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
¶
¡ r
¾
= pvv + (pr + °) r ¡ °
µ
´
¯ + ´
v¿r½ +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
¶
: (13)
Then, the ¯rst-order conditions for cost minimization in (13) can be obtained as:8
@CP (v; r)
@v
= pv ¡ ° ´
¯ + ´
¿v¿¡1r½ = 0; (14)
@CP (v; r)
@r
= (pr + °)¡ ° ´
¯ + ´
½v¿r½¡1 = 0: (15)
We ¯rst solve (14) and (15) with regard to v and r, respectively, and substitute them
into (12):
v =
·½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾½
xS
¸ 1
¿+½
; (16)
r =
"½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾¡¿
xS
# 1
¿+½
: (17)
6Thus, output has to fall to zero whenever one of the two inputs is unused, which is the case, for
instance, of a standard Cobb{Douglas production. Furthermore, the assumption, ¿ + ½ < 1, means that
the production function decribed (12) exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale.
7We assume that w¤ > r, i.e., ´¯+´v
¿r½ + ¼Á¡®¯+´ > r, which not only means that the producer cannot
recycle more waste than what households carry to the producer but also implies that the waste exported
to a foreign country has an inner solution.
8The second-order conditions for minimization are always satis¯ed as
@2CP
@v2 = ¡° ´¯+´ ¿ (¿ ¡ 1) v¿¡2r½ > 0; @
2CP
@r2 = ¡° ´¯+´½ (½¡ 1) v¿r½¡2 > 0;¯¯¯¯
¯@
2CP
@v2
@2CP
@v@r
@2CP
@r@v
@2CP
@r2
¯¯¯¯
¯ =
¯¯¯¯¡° ´¯+´ ¿ (¿ ¡ 1) v¿¡2r½ ¡° ´¯+´ ¿½v¿¡1r½¡1
¡° ´¯+´ ¿½v¿¡1r½¡1 ¡° ´¯+´½ (½¡ 1) v¿r½¡2
¯¯¯¯
=
³
° ´¯+´v
¿¡1r½¡1
´2
¿½ (1¡ ¿ ¡ ½) > 0. (* 0 < ¿ < 1; 0 < ½ < 1; 0 < ¿ + ½ < 1:)
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We can rewrite the producer's cost as a function of xS by using (13) as well as (16)
and (17):
CP (xS) = C
v;r ¢ (xS)
1
¿+½ ¡ °
µ
´
¯ + ´
xS +
¼Á¡ ®
¯ + ´
¶
; (18)
where we replace
"
pv
½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾ ½
¿+½
+ (pr + °)
½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾¡ ¿
¿+½
#
as Cv;r:
Then, the producer's pro¯t maximization problem is expressed as follows:
Max
xS
¦(xS) = pxS ¡ CP (xS) : (19)
The ¯rst-order condition for maximization is:
@¦(xS)
@xS
= p¡MCP (xS) = 0: (20)
Furthermore, by using (18) and (20), we can obtain the inverse supply function of the
producer as follows:
pS (xS) = MC
P (xS)
=
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶
Cv;r ¢ (xS)
1
¿+½
¡1 ¡ ° ´
¯ + ´
: (21)
Substituting (9) and (21) into the market clearing condition, i.e., p¤ = pD (xD) =
pS (xS), the following equation is yielded:
½
¡
µ
¯ + ´ + ¯´
¯ + ´
¶
xD +
µ
µ ¡ ®´ + ¯¼Á
¯ + ´
¶¾
=
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶
Cv;r ¢ (xS)
1
¿+½
¡1¡° ´
¯ + ´
: (22)
We express the equilibrium amount of goods that satis¯es (22) as x¤ (= x¤D = x
¤
S).
In the following, we focus on the probability of the household being caught for illicit
disposal, ¼, which we call the enforcement level, and conduct a comparative static analysis
with respect to ¼.
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2.3 Comparative Statics Results
As described above, the market clearing condition is given by (22). By applying the
implicit function theorem to (22), we can derive the followings:9
dx¤
d¼
< 0; (23)
where x¤ (=x¤D = x
¤
S) ;
dp¤
d¼
< 0; (24)
dw¤
d¼
> 0; (25)
d (x¤ ¡ w¤)
d¼
=
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw
¤
d¼
< 0; (26)
where the asterisk ¤ of each variable expresses its equilibrium amount. That is, p¤, w¤
and x¤¡w¤, respectively, denote the equilibrium price of goods, the equilibrium amount
of legal waste disposal, and that of illegal one.
We can also obtain the following propositions.
Proposition 1. If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of recycling
decreases.
Proof. By using (17) and (23), we have:
dr¤
d¼
=
dr¤
dx¤S
¢ dx
¤
S
d¼
=
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾¡ ¿
¿+½
(xS)
1
¿+½
¡1 ¢ dx
¤
d¼
< 0: (27)
Q.E.D.
According to (23), if the enforcement level increases, then the equilibrium amount of
goods x¤D decreases, which leads to a decrease in the equilibrium supply x
¤
S. Then, by
(17), the decrease in x¤S also causes a decrease in the equilibrium amount of recycling r
¤.
9See Appendix I for details of the derivations.
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Proposition 2. If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of virgin
natural resource used by the producer decreases.
Proof. By using (16) and (23), we have:
dv¤
d¼
=
dv¤
dx¤S
¢ dx
¤
S
d¼
=
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶½
¿ (pr + °)
½pv
¾ ½
¿+½
(xS)
1
¿+½
¡1 ¢ dx
¤
d¼
< 0: (28)
Q.E.D.
Similarly to Proposition 1, if the enforcement level increases, then the equilibrium
values of x¤D and x
¤
S decrease. This induces a decrease in v
¤, i.e., the equilibrium virgin
natural resource used by the producer.
Proposition 3. If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of waste
exported to a foreign country increases.
Proof. By using (25) and Proposition 1, we have:
d (w¤ ¡ r¤)
d¼
=
dw¤
d¼
¡ dr
¤
d¼
> 0: (29)
Q.E.D.
According to (25) and Proposition 1, if the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium
legal waste disposal w¤ increases and the equilibrium amount of recycling r¤ decreases.
Therefore, the equilibrium waste exported to a foreign ¯rm, w¤¡r¤, eventually increases.
These propositions suggest the following. By increasing the enforcement level on
household's illegal dumping, the equilibrium amounts of recycling and the virgin nat-
ural resource used by the producer decrease, while the equilibrium amount of exported
waste increases. That is, control of the enforcement level in°uences not only the house-
hold's behavior directly but also the producer's behavior indirectly, which suggests that
the government's policy for the household can a®ect how much the producer engages in
recycling, uses the virgin resource and exports waste to a foreign country.
A higher level of policing the household's illegal dumping leads to not only an in-
crease in the household's legal waste disposal, w¤, but also a decrease in the household's
demand for goods, x¤D. The former e®ect, i.e., an increase in w
¤, may lead to increase the
potentially recycled material. On the other hand, in response to the latter e®ect, i.e., a
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decrease in x¤D, the ¯rm lowers his/her production itself, which causes a decrease in the
use of inputs, r¤ and v¤. In our model, however, since we consider the possibility that the
¯rm can export waste carried from the household to a foreign country, that former ripple
e®ects can not occur, which leads to a decrease in recycling, r¤, as is shown in Proposition
1, and an increase in the amount of exported waste, w¤ ¡ r¤, as in Proposition 3.
In the next section, we set up a social welfare function and conduct a comparative
static analysis on the second-best policing e®ort.
3 On the Second-best Policing E®ort
3.1 A Social Welfare Function
Our social welfare function consists of the consumer surplus, CS, from which the cost
incurred by the household is deducted, the producer's surplus (the ¯rm's pro¯t), PS, the
government's expected net bene¯t, GB, which is de¯ned here as the di®erence between
the government revenue from the household (the total collection charge of legal disposal,
®w, plus the expected ¯ne revenue, ¼Á(xD ¡ w)) and its expense spent on the policing
e®ort, ¹
2
¼2, and, lastly, the environmental damage costs, DC. We can write such a welfare
function, W , as follows:
W (p; xD; w; v; r) = CS + PS +GB ¡DC
=
½
µxD ¡ 1
2
(xD)
2 +
µ
I ¡ pxD ¡ ®w ¡ ¯
2
w2 ¡ ¼Á (xD ¡ w)¡ ´
2
(xD ¡ w)2
¶¾
+ [p(v¿r½)¡ fpvv + prr ¡ °(w ¡ r)g]
+
n
®w + ¼Á (xD ¡ w)¡ ¹
2
¼2
o
¡ f±d(xD ¡ w) + ±e(w ¡ r)g : (30)
) W (xD; w; xS; r) =
½
µxD ¡ 1
2
(xD)
2 +
µ
I ¡ ¯
2
w2 ¡ ´
2
(xD ¡ w)2
¶¾
¡ CP (xS)¡ ¹
2
¼2 ¡ f±d(xD ¡ w) + ±e(w ¡ r)g : (31)
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Note that the household's payment for xD, pxD, is exactly o®set by the producer's
revenue, p(v¿r½). Similarly, the amount of total penalties paid by the household, ¼Á(xD¡
w), is also o®set by the government's ¯ne revenue, and furthermore, the amount of to-
tal collection charge, ®w, is also o®set between the household and the government. We
can rewrite the producer's cost, fpvv + prr ¡ °(w ¡ r)g, as CP (xS) by using (18). The
expense of the policing e®ort is assumed to be quadratic and increasing in ¼, which is
the probability of catching a illicit waste disposer, with ¹ as an exogenous parameter.
The terms in the last brackets signify two di®erent types of environment-related costs,
where ±d is the marginal cost of illegally disposed waste and ±e is the marginal cost
of exported waste. For simplicity, we assume that all illegally discarded waste by the
household, whether detected or not by the authority, causes environmental damage in a
uniform manner. The environmental damage cost of exported waste is associated with the
external diseconomies occurred through the recycling processes of developing countries.
In these countries, their own governments can not treat or dispose of any imported waste
appropriately and recycling workers' life and health are endangered.
As an important assumption in this study, we consider that the government can only
control one variable, ¼, as its policy instrument through determining the level of resources
devoted to a crackdown on illegal waste disposal. We consider that the severity of policing
activities is signi¯cantly easier to change than other policy instruments, including the
disposal fees/subsidies and recycling charges/subsidies that are typically the focus of
most existing studies. It may even be easier to change than the ¯ne for illicit dumping
owing to the legislative and judicial procedures required for implementation of these
political alterations.
Then, given the equilibrium amount of xD, xS, w and r, the welfare maximization
problem can be expressed as follows:
Max
¼
W (¼) =
·
µx¤D ¡
1
2
(x¤D)
2 +
½
I ¡ ¯
2
(w¤)2 ¡ ´
2
(x¤D ¡ w¤)2
¾¸
¡ CP (x¤S)¡
¹
2
¼2 ¡ f±d(x¤D ¡ w¤) + ±e(w¤ ¡ r¤)g : (32)
The ¯rst-order conditions for the welfare maximization problem with respect to ¼ can
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then be expressed in the following fashion:10
FW :
·µ
@W
@x¤D
+
@W
@x¤S
¶
dx¤
d¼
+
@W
@w¤
¢ dw
¤
d¼
+
@W
@r¤
¢ dr
¤
d¼
¸
+
@W
@¼
= 0: (33)
The crackdown level that satis¯es (33) can be considered as its second-best level, and
we refer to this as ¼¤. Applying the partial derivatives of (32), @W
@x¤D
, @W
@x¤S
, @W
@w¤ and
@W
@r¤ ,
(33) is eventually expressed as follows:11
FW :
·
(¼Á¡ ±d) ¢ dx
¤
d¼
+ f(®¡ ¼Á) + (±d ¡ ±e)g ¢ dw
¤
d¼
+ ±e ¢ dr
¤
d¼
¸
¡ ¹¼ = 0: (34)
In the following section, we conduct a comparative static analysis of the second-best
level of policing e®ort, ¼¤, by using (34).
3.2 Comparative Static Analysis
In this section, we present the results of comparative static analysis. Our comparative
static exercise focuses on the second-best enforcement level ¼¤ and, in particular, examines
how this equilibrium level depends on the environmental parameters.
If FW has the equilibrium solution ¼
¤, we can express the implicit function as follows:
¼¤ = ¼¤(±d; ±e; :::): (35)
By applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain the following propositions.
Proposition 4. If the environmental damage cost associated with the household's
illegal waste disposal increases, the second-best enforcement level should also increase.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem and using (26), combined with the
results derived in Appendix II, we have:12
@¼¤
@±d
= ¡
³
@FW
@±d
´
¡
@FW
@¼
¢ = ¡ ¡ ¡dx¤d¼ ¡ dw¤d¼ ¢¡
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw¤
d¼
¢
Á¡ ¹ > 0: (36)
10The second-order condition of (32) is satis¯ed, i.e., @FW@¼ < 0. See Appendix II.
11See Appendix II for the detailed calculations of @W@x¤D ,
@W
@x¤S
, @W@w¤ and
@W
@r¤ .
12In this case, we ¯x all of the exogenous variables except ±d at their original level, and so we use
@ instead of d and express these as @¼
¤
@±d
. We apply the same notation to the following proposition.
Furthermore, note that @FW@¼ , the denominator of
@¼¤
@± , is always negative. This is also obvious because
@FW
@¼ < 0, i.e., the second-order condition of (32) is always satis¯ed.
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Q.E.D.
This result is rather intuitive in that an increase in environmental damage caused
by illegal waste disposal can be coped with fairly directly by an increase in the level of
policing activities. If the government increases the enforcement level ¼, then it is sure
that the household will decrease the amount of illegal waste disposal, and this leads to a
resolution of the illegal dumping problem.
Proposition 5. If the environmental damage cost of exported waste increases, the
second-best enforcement level should decrease.
Proof. By the implicit function theorem and the results shown in Appendix II, (26)
and Proposition 3, we can derive:
@¼¤
@±e
= ¡
³
@FW
@±e
´
¡
@FW
@¼
¢ = ¡ ¡ ¡dw¤d¼ ¡ dr¤d¼ ¢¡
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw¤
d¼
¢
Á¡ ¹ =
d(w¤¡r¤)
d¼¡
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw¤
d¼
¢
Á¡ ¹ < 0: (37)
Q.E.D.
The environmental damage cost of exported waste, ±e, can increase for several reasons,
for instance, more signi¯cant environmental damage has occurred through the recycling
processes of developing countries, which leads to endanger the life and health of these
countries' recycling workers. A decrease in the enforcement level ¼ generates an increase
in illegal disposal by household and a decrease in legal waste disposal w. Conversely, a
decrease in the enforcement level raises the amount of recycling, r , and therefore the
amount of waste exported to a foreign ¯rm, w¡ r, decreases. This leads to resolving the
problem of exported waste.
The propositions described suggest that, if the government can control only the en-
forcement level as a policy instrument for resolving environmental problems, then whether
it should increase the level or not depends on which problem is currently the most seri-
ous. If the environmental damage cost of exported waste increases, then the government
should decrease the crackdown level and regulate more loosely, whereas, if the environ-
mental damage cost of the household's illegal waste disposal increases, then it should
14
carry out more severe regulation by increasing the level of enforcement.
The illegal dumping by the household, xD¡w, which is not carried to the producer for
recycling, causes the environmental problem. The exported waste by the producer, w¡r,
which has been carried from the household but not reborn as recycled material, also causes
an environmental problem. In the social welfare analysis, we explore how the government
should control the enforcement level on household's illegal dumping when each of the
environmental damage costs, ±d and ±e, increases. The propositions above indicate that,
in terms of the enforcement level, the opposite direction should be taken to deal with
these two problems.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have explored how the second-best crackdown level on illegal waste
dumping depends on the environmental damage costs. As shown, the overall e®ects of
changing the enforcement e®ort against illegal waste dumping are not easy to grasp in
certain situations, and the authority must carefully take into account the impact of its
choices on various aspects of the economy. The comparative static analysis based on
our model indicates that, while the government should respond to the increase in the
cost of illegal disposal by devoting more resources to the crackdown e®ort, it should
decrease its policing e®ort as the environmental damage cost of exported waste becomes
more signi¯cant. The waste the household do not dispose of legally causes the illegal
dumping problem, just as the producer who does not recycle relates to the problem
through exporting those waste to a foreign country. Both problems lead to environmental
damage. In terms of government regulation, however, opposing policy instruments should
be applied to these problems. We also suggest that government policy for the household,
such as more severe regulation of illegal dumping, can indirectly in°uence the producer's
behavior, such as a decrease in recycling, a decrease in the use of the virgin resource and
an increase in exported waste.
We can easily extend our simple model with a recyclable product to more complex sit-
uations. One possible extension would be to include international trade in the recyclable
product, as well as international natural resource input and output markets. Recently,
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the transportation of recyclable waste to developing nations has drawn public attention
from both environmental and commercial perspectives. At the same time, a new line of
economic studies focusing on recycling activities in the context of international trade and
the environment is emerging (e.g., Higashida and Jinji, 2006).
Another potential direction would be to include the dynamic aspects of the envi-
ronment alongside the decision making of concerned economic agents. Some of the en-
vironmental damages involved may exhibit the characteristics of stock pollution, which
necessitates a dynamic analysis. Alternatively, the consideration of time is especially
important when discussing the recycling of durable consumer products, such as house-
hold electric and electrical appliances, whose treatment is attracting attention and some
controversy in Japan. In this situation, we believe that we can use our simple analytical
setup as the basis for more extended analyses in di®erent contexts.
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Appendix I: The Derivations of (23) - (26)
In this appendix, we derive (23) - (26) described in 2.3.
(23) : dx
¤
d¼
< 0; where x¤ (= x¤D= x
¤
S) :
If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of goods decreases.
Proof. By shifting terms, we can rewrite (22) in 2.2 as follows:
FC :
½
¡
µ
¯ + ´ + ¯´
¯ + ´
¶
xD +
µ
µ ¡ ®´ + ¯¼Á
¯ + ´
¶¾
¡
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶
Cv;r¢(xS)
1
¿+½
¡1+°
´
¯ + ´
= 0:
(A1.1)
If (A1.1) has the equilibrium solution x¤, we can express the implicit function as
follows:
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x¤ = x¤(®; ¯; ¼; Á; :::): (A1.2)
By applying the implicit function theorem and ¯xing all the exogenous variables except
¼ at their original levels, we obtain (23) as follows:
dx¤
d¼
= ¡
¡
@FC
@¼
¢¡
@FC
@x
¢
= ¡
¡
³
¯Á
¯+´
´
¡
³
¯+´+¯´
¯+´
´
¡
³
1
¿+½
´³
1
¿+½
¡ 1
´
Cv;r ¢ (xS)
1
¿+½
¡2 < 0: (A1.3)
(* 0 < ¿ + ½ < 1:)
Q.E.D.
(24) : dp
¤
d¼
< 0:
If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium price of goods decreases.
Proof. By using (21) and (23), we have:
dp¤
d¼
=
@p¤
@x¤S
¢ dx
¤
d¼
=
µ
1
¿ + ½
¶µ
1
¿ + ½
¡ 1
¶
Cv;r ¢ (xS)
1
¿+½
¡2 ¢ dx
¤
d¼
< 0: (A1.4)
(* 0 < ¿ + ½ < 1:)
Q.E.D.
(25) : dw
¤
d¼
> 0:
If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of legal waste disposal in-
creases.
Proof. By using (3) and (A1.3), we have:
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dw¤
d¼
=
@w¤
@x¤D
¢ dx
¤
d¼
+
@w¤
@¼
=
µ
´
¯ + ´
¶
¢ dx
¤
d¼
+
µ
Á
¯ + ´
¶
>
µ
´
¯ + ´
¶
¢
µ
¡ ¯Á
¯ + ´ + ¯´
¶
+
µ
Á
¯ + ´
¶
>
µ
´
¯ + ´
¶
¢
µ
¡Á
´
¶
+
µ
Á
¯ + ´
¶
= 0: (A1.5)µ
* ¡
µ
Á
´
¶
< ¡
µ
¯Á
¯ + ´ + ¯´
¶
<
dx¤
d¼
< 0:
¶
Q.E.D.
If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium legal waste disposal w¤ directly
increases, while indirectly decreases through the decrease of the equilibrium amount of
goods x¤D. The indirect decrease expressed as
@w¤
@x¤D
¢ dx¤
d¼
is always smaller than the direct
increase, @w
¤
@¼
, on the absolute value, so the sign of dw
¤
d¼
always becomes positive.
(26) : d(x
¤¡w¤)
d¼
< 0:
If the enforcement level increases, the equilibrium amount of illegal dumping decreases.
Proof. By using (A1.3) and (A1.5), we have:
d (x¤ ¡ w¤)
d¼
=
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw
¤
d¼
< 0: (A1.6)
Q.E.D.
The amount of the illegal dumping can be expressed as the di®erence between the
amount of goods and the legal waste disposal, that is, xD ¡w, so the d(x¤¡w¤)d¼ represents
how much the equilibrium illegal dumping decreases when the enforcement level increases.
In summary, we can suggest the following: If the enforcement level increases and
the regulation on the household's illegal dumping becomes tighter, then the equilibrium
amount of goods, x¤, the equilibrium price of goods, p¤, and the equilibrium amount of
illegal dumping, x¤ ¡ w¤, decreases (*(A1.3), (A1.4) and (A1.6)), while the equilibrium
amount of legal disposal, w¤, increases (*(A1.5)).
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Appendix II: The Partial Derivatives of the Social
Welfare Analysis
In this appendix, we derive the sign of the partial derivatives used in the proposition 4 -
5 in section 3.2.
As described in 3.1, the ¯rst-order condition for the welfare maximization problem
with respect to ¼ was represented as follows:
Max
¼
W (¼) =
·
µx¤D ¡
1
2
(x¤D)
2 +
½
I ¡ ¯
2
(w¤)2 ¡ ´
2
(x¤D ¡ w¤)2
¾¸
¡ CP (x¤S)¡
¹
2
¼2 ¡ f±d(x¤D ¡ w¤) + ±e(w¤ ¡ r¤)g :
FW :
·µ
@W
@x¤D
+
@W
@x¤S
¶
dx¤
d¼
+
@W
@w¤
¢ dw
¤
d¼
+
@W
@r¤
¢ dr
¤
d¼
¸
+
@W
@¼
= 0: (A2.1)
The partial derivatives of x¤D and x
¤
S can be expressed as follows:
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@W
@x¤D
+
@W
@x¤S
= fµ ¡ x¤D ¡ ´ (x¤D ¡ w¤)g ¡ ±d ¡MCP (x¤S)
= ¼Á¡ ±d: (A2.2)
* µ ¡ x¤D ¡ ´ (x¤D ¡ w¤) = p¤ + ¼Á: (A2.3)
*MCP (x¤S) = p¤: (A2.4)
Similarly, the partial derivative of w¤ can be yielded as follows:14
@W
@w¤
= f¡¯w¤ + ´ (x¤D ¡ w¤)g+ (±d ¡ ±e)
= (®¡ ¼Á) + (±d ¡ ±e) : (A2.5)
13(A2.3) is yielded by combining (2) and (8), and we can obtain (A2.4) by (20).
14(A2.6) is yielded by (2).
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* ¡¯w¤ + ´ (x¤D ¡ w¤) = (®¡ ¼Á) : (A2.6)
We can also obtain:
@W
@r¤
= ±e: (A2.7)
Finally, by substituting (A2.2), (A2.5) and (A2.7) into (A2.1), we can rewrite:
FW :
·
(¼Á¡ ±d) ¢ dx
¤
d¼
+ f(®¡ ¼Á) + (±d ¡ ±e)g ¢ dw
¤
d¼
+ ±e ¢ dr
¤
d¼
¸
¡ ¹¼ = 0: (A2.8)
As described in 3.2, if (A2.8) has the equilibrium solution ¼¤, we can express the
implicit function as follows:
¼¤ = ¼¤(±d; ±e; :::): (A2.9)
By applying the implicit function theorem and using (26) and (29), we can obtain the
following results, which we use in the proposition 4 - 5 in section 3.2.
@FW
@¼
=
µ
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw
¤
d¼
¶
Á¡ ¹ < 0; (A2.10)
@FW
@±d
= ¡
µ
dx¤
d¼
¡ dw
¤
d¼
¶
> 0; (A2.11)
@FW
@±e
= ¡dw
¤
d¼
+
dr¤
d¼
= ¡
µ
dw¤
d¼
¡ dr
¤
d¼
¶
= ¡d (w
¤ ¡ r¤)
d¼
< 0: (A2.12)
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